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1. See U.S. Courts, Federal Court Management Statistics-1997: U.S. District Court -
Judicial Caseload Profile, http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cms.pl (use the “Generate” feature
to access the statistics for “ALL DISTRICT COURTS”) (last visited July 2, 2006).  During the
twelve-month period ending September 30, 1995, 281,681 cases were filed in the United States
federal district courts.  Id.  Ten years later, the number of filings for the same twelve-month
period had risen to 330,721.  U.S. Courts, Federal Court Management Statistics-2005: U.S.
District Court - Judicial Caseload Profile, http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2005.pl (use
the “Generate” feature to access the statistics for “ALL DISTRICT COURTS”) (last visited July
2, 2006).  This represents a 17.4% increase in the number of case filings.  Additionally, filings
of appeals with the United States courts of appeals have increased 36.7% — from 50,072 in the
fiscal year 1995 to 68,473 in 2005.  See U.S. Courts, Federal Courts Management Statistics-
2005: U.S. Court of Appeals - Judicial Caseload Profile, http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/
cmsa2005.pl (use the “Generate” feature to access the statistics for “NATIONAL TOTALS”)
(last visited July 2, 2006); U.S. Courts, Federal Courts Management Statistics-1997: U.S. Court
of Appeals - Judicial Caseload Profile, http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa.pl (use the
“Generate” feature to access the statistics for “NATIONAL TOTALS”) (last visited July 2,
2006).
2. U.S. Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures tbl. 2.3, http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfacts
figures/Table203.pdf (last visited July 2, 2006).
3. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2005 ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR: JUD. BUS. OF
THE U.S. CTS. 42 tbl. S-3, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/tables/s3.pdf.  This
table excludes statistics from the Federal Circuit.
4. Id.  Of the unpublished opinions, 5211 were written and signed; 18,254 were written,
reasoned, and unsigned; and 946 were written, unsigned, and without comment.  Id.
403
Building Law, Not Libraries: The Value of Unpublished
Opinions and Their Effects on Precedent*
I. Introduction
Over the past ten years, Americans have called on the federal and state
judiciaries to settle an increasing number of disputes.1  Many factors contribute
to the rise in case filings, but a rise in criminal appeals and immigration
proceeding appeals in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
have demonstrably contributed to the increase.2  In response, courts have
turned to the unpublished opinion as one method of managing the increased
caseload.  For example, in the twelve-month period ending September 30,
2005, the federal circuit courts filed 29,913 opinions in cases terminated on the
merits.3  Of those opinions, 24,411 were unpublished, representing 81.6% of
the total opinions filed.4  The United States Court of Appeals for the First
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8. See Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 22 (2002)
[hereinafter Hearing] (prepared statement of Kenneth J. Schmier, Chairman, Committee for the
Rule of Law) (recounting his personal experience in a contract dispute case in California in
which the judge issued a ruling and unpublished opinion that seemed contrary to the state of
California’s contract law at that time).
9. Id. at 12 (prepared statement of Alex Kozinski, J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit) (noting the difficulty in maintaining a clear and consistent body of caselaw when judges
are called upon to decide a tremendous number of cases and the ramifications of an unclear and
inconsistent body of caselaw).
10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; FED. R. CRIM. P. 2; FED. R. APP. P. 2.
11. Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 181
(1999).
12. The Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
13. The purpose of the Judicial Conference is to “make a comprehensive survey of the
condition of business in the courts of the United States and prepare plans for assignment of
Circuit led all circuit courts in publication of opinions by publishing 42.8% of
its opinions,5 whereas the Fourth Circuit’s practices placed that circuit at the
opposite end of the publication spectrum with a publication rate of only 8.2%.6
With 26.2% of its opinions published, the Tenth Circuit’s publication rate was
higher than the combined national rate by 7.8%.7
Balancing the competing interests of litigants, judges, and the judicial
system is difficult and becomes more onerous as caseloads increase.  Litigants
desire principled resolutions to their disputes based on applicable law.8  Judges
seek to produce well-reasoned opinions that substantially contribute to the
jurisdiction’s established body of caselaw.9  The system as a whole, however,
strives for a judicially efficient and an economical administration of justice.10
The former chief judge and current sitting judge of the Sixth Circuit explained
the balance simply by stating, “The alternatives basically come down to
changing the input to the United States Courts of Appeals or changing the
output from them.”11  
One solution for the federal courts is increasing the number of federal
judgeships, but several obstacles to such an increase exist.  For example,
Congress created the circuit courts of appeals pursuant to its power under
Article III of the Constitution.12  As part of this power, Congress controls the
number of judges sitting on each court, and the circuits can only encourage
Congress to create additional judgeships through the Judicial Conference of
the United States (Judicial Conference).13  
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judges to or from circuits or districts where necessary.”  28 U.S.C. § 331 (Supp. II 2002).  The
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, as the presiding officer of the Judicial Conference,
must submit an annual report to Congress that includes the Judicial Conference’s findings
regarding the judicial business and its recommendations for legislation.  Id.
14. See Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie L. Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules Governing
Publication and Citation of Opinions, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 251 (2002).
15. Id.  This comment focuses on the use of unpublished opinions in Oklahoma; thus the
rules of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Tenth
Circuit are most relevant to this comment.
16. Id.  For example, the Seventh Circuit disclaims any precedential value in unpublished
opinions and forbids their citation except in very limited circumstance, id. at 254, whereas the
Eleventh Circuit permits the citation of unpublished opinions as persuasive authority, id. at 256.
Also, Colorado forbids any citation of unpublished opinions, id. at 260, whereas Louisiana
permits the citation of all supreme court opinions, id. at 266.  
17. See Lawrence J. Fox, Those Unpublished Opinions: An Appropriate Expedience or an
Abdication of Responsibility?, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1215 (2004) (arguing that ethical
obligations require judges to produce citable opinions); Martin, supra note 11, at 180-81
(advocating for the use of unpublished opinions and limited citation as a means to cope with
“too many cases with too little merit”); Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished
Opinions as Precedent, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1235 (2004); George M. Weaver, The Precedential
Value of Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 39 MERCER L. REV. 477 (1988).
18. Martin, supra note 11, at 185 (“These days, ‘unpublished opinion’ is almost a term of
art, because all federal appeals court opinions may be published in some way even if not in the
official book reporters.”). 
19. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1125 (8th ed. 2004); see also 1ST CIR. R. 36(a) (“[S]ome
opinions are rendered in unpublished form; that is, the opinions are directed to the parties but
are not otherwise published in the official West reporter . . . .”); OKLA. SUP. CT. R. 1.200(b)(5)
(“All memorandum opinions, unless otherwise required to be published, shall be marked: ‘Not
for Official Publication.’ . . . Opinions marked Not For Official Publication shall not be
published in the unofficial reporter, nor on the Supreme Court World Wide Web site, nor in the
Courts, however, have turned to a seemingly practical solution to cope with
increasing caseloads — the use of unpublished opinions.  Both state and
federal courts have implemented rules governing the publication of opinions
and the citation of unpublished opinions in their respective courts.14  All state
appellate systems and each federal circuit have promulgated such rules,15 but
considerable differences exist within the federal system and between the state
systems with respect to publication standards, the precedential weight given
to unpublished opinions, and practitioners’ ability to cite unpublished opinions
to a court.16  These differences fuel debate about the value of unpublished
opinions and their effects on the time honored tradition of relying on case
precedent.17
To understand the debate surrounding unpublished opinions, one must
appreciate the true definition of an unpublished opinion.  The term
“unpublished opinion” is a misnomer.18  Unpublished opinions are those “that
[a] court has specifically designated as not for publication.”19  The term,
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
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official reporter.”). 
20. The Federal Appendix does not contain unpublished opinions from the Eleventh
Circuit, as that circuit does not provide the text of its unpublished opinions to publishers.  See
11TH CIR. R. 36-2, I.O.P. 6.  
21. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899, 2913
(codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (Supp. III 2003) (Federal Management and Promotion of
Electronic Government Services)).
22. On Westlaw, the text of unreported federal appellate and district court opinions since
1945 is searchable in separate databases and in comprehensive databases containing the text of
all opinions issued by federal appellate and district courts.  Similarly, LexisNexis contains
databases with the text of unpublished opinions from federal appellate and district courts in a
searchable form.
23. The Tenth Circuit is comprised of the United States Court of Appeals in Denver,
Colorado, and the United States district courts in Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Utah, and Wyoming.  28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000).
24. Internet users can access unpublished court opinions since 1998 for the Utah Court of
Appeals at Utah State Courts, Utah Court of Appeals Unpublished Decisions by Name,
http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/mds/mdname.htm (last visited July 2, 2006).  
25. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS OR THE
SCIENCE OF CASE LAW 2 (1912).
however, erroneously suggests that these opinions are “secret” and not
generally available to either the legal community or the general public for
inspection and review.  Today, unpublished opinions are available through
several sources.  First, since 2001, West has published in the Federal Appendix
the opinions of the circuit courts not submitted for official publication in the
Federal Reporter.20  Second, Congress enacted legislation in 2002 requiring
all federal circuit and district courts to maintain websites permitting “[a]ccess
to the substance of all written opinions issued by the court, regardless of
whether such opinions are to be published in the official court reporter, in a
text searchable format.”21  Third, unpublished opinions are readily available
and searchable on the electronic databases Westlaw and LexisNexis.22  While
unpublished federal opinions are readily available, locating state unpublished
opinions proves more difficult.  For example, of the six states that comprise
the Tenth Circuit,23 only Utah makes some of the unpublished opinions of its
state courts available online.24
As part of a legal system based on the principles of adherence to precedent
and stare decisis, judges’ opinions are critically important tools used to
determine the law.  Judicial precedents are “adjudged case[s] or decision[s] of
a court of justice, considered as furnishing an example or rule for the
determination of an identical or similar case afterwards arising, between the
same or other parties, in the same or another court, or a similar question of
law.”25 As such, they provide guidance to judges, lawyers, and the public as
to the state of the law.  Thus, a judicial tribunal’s determination of the law in
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss2/5
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26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 10.  The governing rules of each of the five branches of precedent are (1) inferior
courts must adhere to the decisions of courts having jurisdiction over them, (2) the decisions of
the highest court in a jurisdiction are binding on all lower courts in that jurisdiction, (3) a court
of last resort must adhere to the rulings of its past decisions absent a reason for overruling the
decision, (4) a court may look to decisions of other courts for guidance in a case for which there
is no jurisdictional precedent, and (5) judicial comity requires deference to the decisions of
other courts in the interest of consistency.  Id. at 10-11. 
28. Id. at 10.
29. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1443 (defining “stare decisis” as
“[t]he doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation”).
30. William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949).
a specific case implicates not only the parties immediately before the court, but
also other judges and courts and the community as a whole.26  
The term “precedent” encompasses several different aspects and
applications of prior judicial decisions, one of which is stare decisis.27  More
specifically, stare decisis imposes on a court of last resort a duty “to abide by
its own former decisions, and not to depart from or vary them unless entirely
satisfied, in the first place, that they were wrongly decided, and, in the second
place, that less mischief will result from their overthrow than from their
perpetuation.”28  According to this definition, stare decisis is the issue-specific
aspect of the doctrine of precedent requiring courts to resolve reoccurring
issues consistently.29  The late Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas
recognized the importance of stare decisis in furthering the goals of all
involved in the legal system when he commented that “[s]tare decisis serves
to take the capricious element out of law and to give stability to a society.  It
is a strong tie which the future has to the past.”30  In contrast to the more
general nature of courts following decisions made in previous cases based on
precedent, stare decisis mandates a court to decide issues uniformly, absent a
clear need to overrule the past precedent on the specific issue.  Together, stare
decisis and precedent form the basis for common law legal systems.
Because the doctrines of precedent and stare decisis rest on courts’ past
decisions, the designation of opinions as “nonprecedential” and “not for
publication” seems to undermine these two doctrines.  Nevertheless, when
used in accordance with proper publication standards and citation rules,
unpublished opinions play an indispensable role in both the federal and state
judicial systems by providing more efficiency in overburdened systems
without compromising the tradition of precedent that is central to such
systems.  While the current system has room for improvement, both precedent
and unpublished opinions can survive harmoniously, through the use of
publication and citation rules designed to reflect both flexibility in the court
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
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31. Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43,
44 (2001).
32. BLACK, supra note 25, at 14.
system and stability in the body of law.  This comment traces the histories of
precedent and unpublished opinions in the federal and state judiciaries, with
particular focus on the Tenth Circuit and Oklahoma state courts.  Further, this
comment demonstrates that both concepts have coexisted in the past and can
continue to coexist peacefully in the future, balancing the often competing
interests of litigants, judges, and the judicial system while preserving the time-
honored tradition of precedent.  
Part II of this comment examines the history of the doctrine of precedent
from its conceptual birth in early Roman law, through its development in the
English common law, to its incorporation into the American legal system.  Part
III chronicles the development of unpublished opinions as a response to the
changing nature of the judicial system in the mid-twentieth century.  Part IV
discusses the modern treatment of unpublished opinions, especially in
Oklahoma federal and state courts, through the use of publication standards
and citation rules.  Part V suggests improvements to the current rules for
publication of opinions and citation of unpublished opinions to ensure the
perpetuation of precedent in legal systems striving for efficiency.
II. Precedent in the American Legal System
To fully understand the importance of the doctrine of precedent in the
American legal system, one must understand its origins.  The common law
concept of precedent, and stare decisis in particular, distinguishes the
American legal system from many other historic and modern legal systems, as
the “practice of deciding cases by reference and adherence to the past is one
of the defining characteristics of Anglo-American jurisprudence and
distinguishes our system from the civil law, where judges reason from general
principles, not from precedents.”31  From its origins in ancient Rome, through
its refinement in England’s customary system of law, to its modern incarnation
in the United States, precedent has guided judicial systems and influenced
judicial officials for centuries.
A. The Roman Origins of Precedent
Since the beginning of civilization, judicial decisions have been an
important source of law.  In fact, written decisions as sources of law precede
other sources such as statutes or universally applied rules.32  It is important to
note, however, that these judicial opinions were not an official explication of
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss2/5
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37. Id. at 15-16.
38. Id. at 16.
39. Id. at 16-17.
40. Id. at 17.
41. Id. at 17-18.
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id.
the law but merely evidence of judicial custom.33  Judges applied these
customs in difficult cases resembling previously decisions.34  During the early
Roman state, for example, published edicts announcing rules to be applied in
subsequent cases helped strengthen judicial custom.35  This “perpetual edict”
was issued by a judicial official, called a praetor, at the commencement of his
term of office and remained in force for the duration of his term.36  Eventually,
the custom became a matter of course because “[a]fter the praetorian
jurisprudence had assumed a certain scope and fixity, the edict remained
substantially the same under successive judges.”37  The notions embodied in
the edicts were not abstract concepts but were instead principles derived from
actual controversies presented to judicial officials.38  Therefore, in one sense,
something resembling the modern-day concept of precedent — applying the
principles of past cases to similar cases in the future — developed.  In another
sense, however, this ancient system of judicial custom differed from precedent
because judicial adherence to the edict was strictly voluntary and never
became part of the formal Roman law.39
The influence of Justinian, a sixth-century Roman emperor, significantly
impacted judicial custom and its connection to precedent in ancient Rome.  In
response to the chaotic state of the law brought about by the reliance on past
edicts, Justinian compiled a code of laws to govern Rome.40  To promote a
stable body of law, Justinian forbade the publication of secondary resources
interpreting laws and imposed severe penalties on the production of such
materials.41  Furthermore, Justinian required that any inconsistencies in his law
codes be referred to him for official resolution, as the province of interpreting
the laws rested solely with the emperor as opposed to judges.42  Justinian
consolidated the legislative and judicial powers in Rome, for “under the
empire, no sharp line of distinction was drawn between judicial and legislative
functions; and in point of fact, in the person of the emperor himself, they were
very firmly and significantly united.”43  Justinian believed the use of decisions
from the past as guidelines for deciding cases perpetuated erroneous principles
of law; so to ensure that this perpetuation did not occur, Justinian stated in one
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
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44. Id. at 20-21 (quoting Code Just. 7.45.13 (Justinian 529)).
45. Id. at 21.
46. Id. at 16.
47. Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Science:
From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 444 (1996).
48. WILLIAM F. WALSH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 57 (2d ed. 1932) (noting
that “[t]he reign of Henry II marks the dividing line between the ancient customary law . . . and
the common law as we understand it today”).
49. BLACK, supra note 25, at 24.
50. WALSH, supra note 48, at 57-58.
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 59 (“To understand what Henry accomplished, we must remember that his power
as a law administrator was practically unlimited.  He stood as the source of all justice, and his
court was simply his instrument for doing justice among his people.”).
53. Id. at 61-62.
54. Id. at 64.
of his codes that “judgment must be given not according to examples, but
according to the laws.”44  The changes Justinian made to the system of custom
once prevalent in Rome formed the basis of the European civil law societies,45
whereas a process similar to the earlier customary system of law formed the
basis for the English common law.46
B. Establishment of the Common Law in England and the Influence of Sir
Edward Coke
1. The Resurrection of Customary Law
While the customary system gave way to a more empirical system in Rome,
England resurrected the customary system of law, and it flourished in the
English legal system.47  The common law of today is said to have begun during
the reign of Henry II.48  The common law itself arose not from a set of
established rules, but instead, the law emanated from judicial decisions of the
past.49  
Prior to the commencement of Henry II’s reign in the mid-twelfth century,
localities in England had established their own local laws, not through
legislation, but through unwritten custom,50 and the local courts, as opposed
to the national King’s Court, had the task of administering these laws.51  With
his enormous power over the English system of justice,52 Henry II united
England under a common system of laws administered through the King’s
Court.53  The law that Henry II’s judges administered was unknown until
announced in their decisions, even though most of this law is thought to have
been once a part of the local courts.54  When discrepancies between customs






58. Healy, supra note 31, at 56-58.
59. WALSH, supra note 48, at 71; Healy, supra note 31, at 58.
60. Healy, supra note 31, at 58.
61. Id.
62. WALSH, supra note 48, at 71.
63. Healy, supra note 31, at 58.
64. Id. at 59.
65. Id. at 60.
and declare the law of the land.55  Resolution was effectuated under the
discretion of the judges:
[Judges] took the raw material of the customary law, selected what
was good, rejected what was bad, and created out of it all a system
of law for the nation which was distinctly new, though based on the
customs of the past and grounded on fundamental principles or
legal concepts which in most cases can be traced back to the
Anglo-Saxon period, in other cases to Roman law.56
The compilation and reconciliation of the customary laws of England’s
individual counties and localities instituted by Henry II formed a legal
structure truly common to all Englishmen.  Against this backdrop the doctrine
of stare decisis must be interpreted.57
Because the common law relied heavily on past decisions of judges, its
further development mandated an established system of recording.  For judges
to adhere to precedent, they needed a tangible record of previous cases from
which to discern the proper precedent.  The Year Books provided the first such
record.  The English Year Books contained one of the earliest accounts of
English judicial decisions.58  First appearing in the thirteenth century, the Year
Books served as a record of all court cases and lasted through the mid-
sixteenth century.59    Early in their history, the Year Books recorded pleading
information about cases, arguments made, and even some commentary,60 but
the Year Books usually did not contain the opinions of the court.61  Even
without the court’s official opinion, however, lawyers compiled the Year
Books and used them to discern precedents for later cases.62  Although the Year
Books were important to the development of common law, they were not the
origin of stare decisis,63 mostly because the failure to record actual court
opinions hindered their use as binding authority in a court of law.64  Toward
the end of the Year Books’ existence, however, the shift from oral pleadings
to written pleadings permitted a more thorough analysis of the substantive
issues of a particular case.65  This transition “made the Year Books a more
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006




69. Id. at 60-61.
70. Id. at 61.
71. Berman & Reid, supra note 47, at 445. 
72. WALSH, supra note 48, at 71.
73. Berman & Reid, supra note 47, at 446.
74. Id.
75. Healy, supra note 31, at 62.
76. Berman & Reid, supra note 47, at 446-47 (“It was Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634) more
than any other person, and perhaps more than all others put together, who established the
authority of rules on the basis that they had been previously enunciated by courts of common
law.”).
fertile source of case law, and judges and lawyers began to cite precedents
more frequently.”66
It is important to note, though, that at no point during this time did judges
feel bound by the caselaw discernible from the Year Books.67  Judges became
aware of the ways in which they shaped the law, “[b]ut they did not think their
power as judges was restrained by precedent.”68  When confronted with a
precedent they disliked, judges did not usually distinguish the case before them
from the unfavorable precedent;69 instead, judges simply ignored the precedent
and ruled according to their own views about the correct application of justice
or reason in the particular case.70  Thus, the cases contained within the Year
Books had only persuasive, not binding, authority.71  
Eventually, the modern version of reporters replaced the Year Books as the
method of recording the common law.72  The Year Books, however, marked the
common law’s first attempt to record the proceedings of early English courts
and proved to be a useful tool for lawyers to discern trends in the law, even if
the Year Books did not serve as an authoritative source of binding precedent.
2. The Influence of Sir Edward Coke
The next set of law reports introduced the modern notion of precedent.
Mainly named for their authors, these new reporters contained the facts of
cases and statements of counsel and judges, as well as commentary by the
author of the reporter.73  These new reporters helped establish procedural
customs to be followed by successive judges.74  Sir Edward Coke, Chief
Justice of the Court of Common Pleas from 1606 to 1613 and Chief Justice of
the King’s Bench from 1613 to 1616,75 was instrumental in ushering in the
modern view of precedent and securing its place in legal history and practice.76
Coke published a thirteen-volume treatise of past cases of the courts, known
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss2/5
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77. Healy, supra note 31, at 62.
78. Berman & Reid, supra note 47, at 447.
79. Id.; see also Healy, supra note 31, at 64.
80. Healy, supra note 31, at 63.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 64 (quoting CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE
AND TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 304-05 (1957)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 65.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 66.
simply as The Reports.77  Coke regarded the rules in pre-Tudor cases as
important and designed his reports as an authoritative source on those cases.78
Even though Coke’s reports presented one of the best methods of utilizing the
doctrine of precedent, difficulties arose because Coke often altered the
language of cases to coincide with his own views of the law.79  Coke’s
personality and the comprehensive nature of The Reports, however, lent
credibility to Coke’s work and forced lawyers to recognize and cite precedent
for the first time.80
In addition to The Reports, Coke further solidified the notion of precedent
in England by using the Year Books to cite cases challenging King James I’s
position as the head of English law.81  Coke waged a battle with the King by
citing ancient precedents to contradict the validity of acts of the King.82
During one challenge to the King’s ability to hear cases himself, Coke, in
response to an argument that only reason was needed to decide cases, asserted
“that what was needed to decide cases was not natural reason, which anyone
could possess, but an ‘artificial Reason and Judgment of Law, which requires
long Study and Experience before that a man can attain to the cognizance of
it.’”83  With this statement, precedent became the center of common law, and
the authority to decide cases shifted from the King to the judiciary alone.84
Even though Coke forced lawyers and judges to acknowledge the
importance of precedent, its acceptance was not without trepidation.  English
judges feared “that strict adherence to past decisions would undermine one of
the common law’s most important features — its flexibility.”85  During the
seventeenth century, English jurists regarded this flexibility as the common
law’s greatest strength at a time when other European nations were adopting
law codes based on the more rigid and fixed Roman civil law.86  Coke also
embraced the notion of adaptability in the common law and believed that
judges should constantly reexamine and strive for clearer applications of the
law by applying the law to new matters before the courts.87  Further, Coke
believed that the law should be continually tested over time to ensure its
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006




91. Id. at 67.  Natural law is “[a] philosophical system of legal and moral principles
purportedly deriving from a universalized conception of human nature or divine justice rather
than from legislative or judicial action.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1055.
92. Healy, supra note 31, at 67.
93. Id. at 68.
94. Id. at 68-69.
95. Id. at 72-73.
96. WALSH, supra note 48, at 86-90.
relevance to the experiences of the past and the needs of the future.88  Coke’s
views about the flexibility of the common law reaffirmed his beliefs in the
importance of precedent, because “[u]nder his view, . . . attention to precedent
was vital because it facilitated the continual accretion of knowledge.  But a
rigid approach to precedent would halt this process and fix the law in place,
with no hope of further improvement.”89
The tension between the adherence to precedent and the flexibility in the
common law persisted from Coke’s death in 1634 through the eighteenth
century.90  Two reasons existed for this persistence.  First, judges still believed
in natural law and the idea that natural law supplied universal principles that
could not be changed by precedents that conflicted with those principles.91
English jurists reconciled natural law and precedent by stating that decided
cases were not the law themselves, but only evidence of the law.92  Second,
poor reports of judges’ decisions in cases prevented the wholehearted
acceptance of precedent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.93
Omissions of “unimportant” and “wrongly decided” cases and the existence
of gross inaccuracies in those included in a reporter made judges reluctant to
follow precedent.94  By the close of the eighteenth century, a reliable system
of law reports had not yet emerged in England, and English judges still did not
feel obligated to strictly adhere to precedent.95  At the same time, the emerging
American judicial system was facing challenges similar to those confronting
England in the establishment of a system of common law based upon
precedent.
C. Establishing Precedent in an Emerging Nation
When the English colonized North America, they did not adhere
wholeheartedly to the English common law.  Upon their first arrival in the
seventeenth century, magistrates in some colonies applied the law of God,
reason, or equity in the absence of controlling express law.96  Magistrates
examined the English common law but viewed it only as an illustration of
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statute.97  Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas adopted a type of common
law distinct from the formalistic common law applied in England.98  Instead
of relying on volumes of recorded decisions handed down by English legal
professionals to establish a body of common law, the early American common
law was facilitated by untrained judicial officers without experience as
attorneys or judges.99  Because of the lack of trained officials, the colonial
law’s defining characteristic was informality.  This characteristic illustrates the
nexus between the law of reason and early colonial law: “[I]ts popular
informal character, with courts of laymen generally consisting of several
persons administering customary law according to the general sense of reason
and justice of the community as expressed in the sense of reason and justice
of the magistrates or judges who decided the cases.”100  The informality
stemmed directly from “[t]he special needs of a newly-settled country with a
homogenous population in each colony . . . without lawyers or English law
books.”101
By respecting the informal common law that emerged in the colonies, early
American Supreme Court justices recognized the differences between England
and America and considered these differences when making their decisions.102
Examining the common law of England and its place in American law, Justice
Story said that “[t]he common law of England is not to be taken in all respects
to be that of America.  Our ancestors brought with them its general principles,
and claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted only
that portion which was applicable to their situation.”103  Therefore, no rule of
English common law was incorporated into the American common law unless
the legislature or prior judicial official found relevance and value for the
English rule in America.104
Cognizant of its special needs, the American judicial system proceeded to
establish workable doctrines of common law and precedent.  The United
States’ lack of an official judicial reporting system arose as a great obstacle in
the path toward the development of an American common law through which
precedent could be applied.105  Despite this obstacle to development,
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discussion regarding the need for reporters is not present in the records of the
first Congress, which met in 1789.106  Additionally, there is no record of
discussion about a reporter system among the Justices of the Supreme Court
during its first three terms.107  In 1791, however, after three terms with empty
dockets, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in its first case, and legal
practitioners recognized the need for an official system for reporting the
decisions of the Court.108  The daunting task of developing a reporting system
first fell to Alexander Dallas.
1. The Tenuous Early Volumes of the Reports
Dallas, a Jamaican-born and English-educated member of the Philadelphia
bar, had been publishing the Reports, which contained decisions of the
Pennsylvania and Delaware courts.109  His Reports were so well received by
colleagues and the bench that Dallas’s first volume of the Reports is regarded
as the first volume of the United States Reports, despite the absence of any
Supreme Court case.110  With his Reports, Dallas attempted to aid legal
professionals by distilling the basic points of law emanating from each case.111
In addition, Dallas compiled an index of cases cited by the courts, a feature not
seen in any other prior case reporter.112  Recognizing the link between
reporting and precedent, Dallas’s “innovation [of the citing indices] . . . [met]
the needs of a post-Revolutionary bar hungry for precedent; and the relative
brevity of the index reveals what a pioneering effort it was.”113  
While Dallas’s early volumes were an important step in establishing a
workable foundation to which courts could turn for precedent, they were not
without error.  Many factors, including lack of funding, contributed to certain
volumes of Dallas’s Reports being characterized by delay and incompletion.114
Often, new volumes were not published and did not reach the public for
several years after the Court’s decisions were rendered,115 and this delay “was
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a major hindrance to those hungry for information concerning the
jurisprudence of the highest federal tribunal, particularly its appellate
practice.”116  In addition to the delay at the time of publishing, subsequent
analysis of Dallas’s Reports has revealed the Reports’ incompletion.  Scholars
disagree about the level of incompleteness, with claims of omitted cases
ranging between 10% and 50% of the Court’s total cases.117  All agree,
however, that the question is “not whether but to what extent” the Reports are
incomplete.118  Dallas’s Reports, although not completely reliable, assisted in
overcoming a large hurdle — the lack of recorded judicial decisions — in the
path of a developing judiciary.
Building on the foundation laid by Dallas, William Cranch assumed the role
of reporting the decisions of the Supreme Court and sought to improve the
quality by which decisions were reported.119  Cranch’s volumes contained
summaries of the arguments presented by counsel as well as the indices begun
by Dallas.120  Also, Cranch supplemented the decisions with appendices
composed of information that he viewed as useful to practitioners.121  While
these features contributed to the usefulness of the Reports, Cranch’s tardiness
in reporting decisions rendered many of the Reports’ useful features
obsolete.122  The years-long delays between the Court’s issuance of a decision
and its publication by Cranch “necessarily diminished, in many instances
almost to the vanishing point, the immediate impact that the Court’s actions
might otherwise have been expected to have on the bar and the public at
large.”123  In 1815, the Court’s dissatisfaction with Cranch reached its pinnacle
as Cranch had yet to publish the Court’s opinions decided as far back as its
February 1810 term, rendering those 131 opinions unavailable to other legal
professionals.124  Without providing notice of the current trends in the law and
the present interpretations of the laws by the nation’s highest judicial officials,
Cranch’s Reports stalled the growth of precedent because an accurate
recording of the law was not available for use by attorneys or other courts.
Unfortunately, other modes of communicating information about the state
of the law to attorneys and judges sitting on other courts proved unreliable as
well.  In addition to the shortcomings in timeliness and accuracy of the
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Reports, newspaper accounts of Supreme Court decisions were also inadequate
to significantly further the doctrine of precedent in the United States.125  For
example, when the Court issued its opinion in Marbury v. Madison,126 some
newspapers printed the text of the opinion, but others printed only a small
portion of the opinion.127  Also, the newspaper attention given to the landmark
decision focused not on Chief Justice Marshall’s establishment of judicial
review but on the court’s foray into presidential powers.128  Thus, the
newspapers ignored the crux of the opinion in this important case.129  In an era
when judges sought to establish and develop a body of law based upon
previously decided cases, “[t]he unavailability of accurate and full newspaper
accounts of the decisions of the Supreme Court made the prompt publication
of Cranch’s Reports essential.  His chronic inability to accomplish that
objective became a source of considerable dismay to leading members of the
profession, including the Justices themselves.”130  In general, the Reports of
Dallas and Cranch began the process of recording cases, a process necessary
for the development of precedent, but their tardiness, incompleteness, and
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inaccuracies greatly inhibited the establishment of a strong and reliable
recording system.
2. Wheaton’s Establishment of a Reliable Reporter
The appointment of Justice Joseph Story to the Supreme Court in 1811
brought a vigilant advocate of accurate reporting to the bench.131  Justice Story
was “keenly aware of the advantages of prompt, accurate reporting and deeply
interested in the promotion of a national jurisprudence.”132  Justice Story
entered into a mentoring relationship with Henry Wheaton, Cranch’s eventual
successor, and the relationship between the two men proved mutually
beneficial.133  As a federal circuit judge, Justice Story developed an interest in
admiralty law and desired the establishment of case precedent in the field.134
To accomplish this daunting task, Justice Story elicited Wheaton’s help to
publish the admiralty opinions that Story decided as a circuit judge.135  The
result, Wheaton’s Digest of the Law of Maritime Captures and Prizes, quickly
received great praise from legal professionals as it provided extensive analysis
of the state of admiralty law in the United States and in several foreign
jurisdictions.136  Dissatisfied with Cranch’s work, Wheaton’s relationship with
Justice Story and the acclaim for his earlier work led the Justices of the
Supreme Court to appoint Wheaton as the Court’s official reporter in 1816.137
From his appointment as the official reporter, Wheaton brought vigilance
and dedication not exhibited by his predecessors to the reporting of the
Supreme Court’s decisions.138  Wheaton threw himself into the work of the
Court, attending sessions of the Court six days per week, receiving only rare
visits from his wife or his friends, and becoming a part of the intimate circle
of the Justices.139  These circumstances created an auspicious environment for
Wheaton to overcome the problems that plagued the Reports under Dallas and
Cranch.140  Initially, Wheaton appeared poised to publish a volume of the
Reports within mere months of the completion of the Supreme Court’s
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
420 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:403
141. Id. at 1324-25.  The February 1816 term concluded on March 21, 1816, and by early
May, Wheaton “had completed his work in preparing the opinions, abstracts and arguments of
counsel for the press.”  Id. at 1325.
142. Id. at 1325, 1327. 
143. Id. at 1327.
144. Id. at 1328. 
145. Id.
146. Id.  A few of those distinguished members included Daniel Webster, Henry Clay,
William Pinkney, Samuel Dexter, William Wirt, David B. Ogden, Richard Rush, Thomas Addis
Emmett, and Robert Goodloe Harper.  Id.
147. Id. at 1328-29.
148. Id. at 1329.
149. Id.
150. Id.
February 1816 term.141  Unfortunately, Wheaton’s inability to secure an
acceptable publisher resulted in a seven-month delay in publication and
subjected him to increased scrutiny and skepticism,142 but  “[f]ortunately for
Wheaton, the publication of the Reports for the 1816 Term prior to the
commencement of the 1817 Term answered all doubts regarding the wisdom
of the Court in appointing a new Reporter.”143  Apart from this initial struggle
for Wheaton, his subsequent volumes of the Reports generally became
available during the summer following each term.144  By publishing the
Reports in a timely manner, Wheaton conquered the obstacle of delay that
plagued his predecessors.
While Wheaton’s timeliness elevated the status of his volumes of the
Reports over those of Dallas and Cranch, Wheaton also had to improve upon
the completeness and accuracy lacking in his predecessors’ volumes.
Wheaton’s first challenge to the creation of a complete record of the Supreme
Court’s business arose when he decided to provide only an outline of the
arguments of counsel instead of including the arguments in full.145  This
choice, driven by a desire to maintain a manageable body of work, irked many
of the distinguished members of the Supreme Court bar.146  Although he
continued to provide only outlines, Wheaton appeased the bar by seeking their
help in developing the outlines to include in the Reports,147 and “[i]n due
course, the bar became so confident of Wheaton’s talent and good will that it
dismissed its former anxieties and entrusted matters willingly into his
hands.”148  Wheaton further confronted the tension between completeness and
manageability in using his discretion to omit cases altogether from the
Reports.149  In making those decisions, Wheaton recognized that some cases
turned on questions of fact, not interpretations of law, and would not
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precedential value continued virtually uncriticized throughout Wheaton’s term
as the Supreme Court’s official reporter.151
While Wheaton may have taken liberties with the completeness of the
Reports, he took no liberties with the accuracy of the information included.
Wheaton meticulously reviewed copies of the proof sheets in an effort to avoid
even the smallest of errors.152  Wheaton recognized the importance of an
accurate compilation of the state of the law, noting: 
It is a duty which [the Reporter] owes to the Court, to the
profession, and to his own reputation, to maintain the fidelity of the
Reports, which are received as authentic evidence of the
proceedings and adjudications of this high tribunal.  If they are not
to be relied on in this respect, they are worthless.153
With a timely, complete, and accurate portrayal of the proceedings before the
nation’s highest court, Wheaton overcame the obstacles previously hindering
the establishment of a reliable set of reporters to which legal professionals
could turn to analyze precedent.  Wheaton continued in his capacity as the
official reporter for the Supreme Court until 1827,154 when the drudgery of
producing the Reports155 and the lack of financial gain from the endeavor156
prompted Wheaton to accept an appointment from President John Quincy
Adams as chargé d’affaires to Denmark.157
Following Wheaton’s improvements to the reporting system, Richard
Peters, Jr., Wheaton’s successor, brought an entrepreneurial spirit to the
pursuit of recording the precedents of the Court.158  Unlike his predecessors
who added appendices and marginal notes to the opinions of the Court, Peters
did not view his role as one of “rationalizing and improving the law through
his own erudite contributions.”159  Instead, Peters successfully attempted to
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transform the business of the Court into a financial enterprise, and “[i]n
seeking to exploit that potential, he was to increase dramatically the
profession’s access to the Court’s decisions, both at the practical level of
decreased expense and as a matter of legal doctrine.”160  With an affordable
copy of the Reports, lawyers and other judges could begin to analyze the
nation’s emerging precedent for the dual purposes of properly counseling
clients about the state of the law and of bolstering arguments by citing to
specific cases on point.  Even though history remembers Wheaton as the
originator of a reliable and complete set of reports,161 “Peters’ genius lay in his
recognition that there existed in the new nation a substantial and as yet
untapped market for reports of the decisions of the Supreme Court, ready to
be exploited if only the cost of obtaining them could be reduced dramatically.
This, Peters accomplished.”162  The accomplishments of both Wheaton and
Peters permitted public and judicial access to a reliable record of judicial
decisions and, in turn, facilitated the use of precedent in the American judicial
system.
D. Precedent’s Importance in Oklahoma
Because of the work accomplished by the early court reporters, especially
Wheaton and Peters, precedent became and has remained a central element of
judicial decision making in the United States.  Both state and federal courts in
Oklahoma recognize the importance of precedent, and particularly stare
decisis, in deciding cases.163  In In re Smith,164 the Tenth Circuit firmly stated
that it is “bound by the precedent of prior panels absent en banc
reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court.”165
In In re Smith, a three-judge panel of the Tenth Circuit heard a case in which
the “[r]espondent was ordered to show cause why he should not be . . .
disciplined for filing frivolous appeals” in a number of cases.166  The panels
that heard the original appeals at issue had determined that the appeals were,
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bound by the determinations of the previous panels regarding the frivolous
nature of the appeals and proclaimed that the principles of stare decisis and
precedent mandated the same finding in the case before it.168   The Tenth
Circuit’s opinion in In re Smith stated the circuit’s belief in the importance of
abiding by the decisions of previous judges and reaffirmed the importance of
precedent in the law of the circuit.
Again, in United States v. Meyers169 the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its
commitment to following the precedent established by prior circuit cases.  In
Meyers, the court explicitly declared which parts of an opinion bind a later
court when it stated that “[t]he precedent of prior panels which this court must
follow includes not only the very narrow holdings of those prior cases, but also
the reasoning underlying those holdings, particularly when such reasoning
articulates a point of law.”170  With this language, the Tenth Circuit reiterated
its belief in the importance of precedent and informed the legal profession of
the circuit’s commitment to follow not only the holdings of previous cases, but
also the reasoning judges used in deciding those previous cases.  Both In re
Smith and Meyers illustrate that the Tenth Circuit has a documented belief in
the value of precedent and seeks to adhere to this important judicial doctrine
whenever possible.
The Oklahoma state courts share the Tenth Circuit’s belief in the value of
precedent.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed its views concerning the
importance of precedent in Rodgers v. Higgins.171  When confronted with an
argument advocating the overruling of a previously decided and settled case,
the court found no compelling reason to do so.172  In making this decision, the
court stated that “stare decisis means to abide by decided cases.  This time-
honored rule ‘serves to take the capricious element out of law’ and give it
stability. . . . Unless precedents are ‘palpably bad,’ judicial surgery in upsetting
them must be avoided.”173   This case illustrates the important role that
precedent has assumed in the state judiciary and the judiciary’s belief in the
inherent value of previously decided cases in establishing a stable and just
system of law in Oklahoma.  
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has also recognized the
importance of precedent in criminal law jurisprudence.  That court has
acknowledged its duty “to promote health in the administration of the law,”174
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a goal that “can be attained only by an honest endeavor to eliminate bad
precedents, as well as to establish good precedents.”175  The court, however,
was careful to recognize the distinctions between the needs of the criminal law
and the needs of the civil law.176  Precedent and stare decisis are important in
the criminal law, but “[t]he doctrine of stare decisis is not the sacred tenet in
criminal law that it rightfully is in civil law.”177  Even though the nature of
criminal law may diminish the importance of precedent, the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals has recognized that precedent plays a role in promoting
a healthy administration of the law.  
The opinions of federal and state courts in Oklahoma expressly indicate that
judges in the state regard the doctrine of precedent highly.  Precedent, and the
application of consistent legal holdings and reasoning in like cases using stare
decisis, ensures the maintenance of a coherent and cohesive body of law from
which Oklahoma practitioners discern the state of the law.  From its early roots
in Roman customs, its enhancement in the English common law through the
scholarly work of Sir Edward Coke, and its solidification as a pillar of the
American judicial system through the peerless work of Henry Wheaton, the
use of prior judicial actions as a means to decide subsequent cases has assumed
a prominent role in the courts of this state and courts across the country.
Especially in England and America, a written record of the proceedings before
a court and their outcomes was the impetus for a truly workable and applicable
doctrine of precedent, but with the proper publication and citation standards,
unpublished opinions can ease the burden on those charged with maintaining
official court publications while promoting a manageable and cohesive body
of caselaw in the jurisdiction.
III. The History of Unpublished Opinions
With the number of published opinions and the number of reporters
recording these opinions rapidly increasing, “[o]ne response of American
courts to the unmanageable growth of law reports has been to limit the
publication of their decisions.”178  In its 1964 annual report, the Judicial
Conference addressed some of the problems associated with the rapid growth
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in the sheer “number of published opinions” in both the district and circuit
courts and the economic and practical difficulties of maintaining libraries
housing all of these opinions.180  In response, the Judicial Conference adopted
a resolution stating, “[t]hat the judges of the courts of appeals and the district
courts authorize the publication of only those opinions which are of general
precedential value and that opinions authorized to be published be succinct.”181
This resolution set in motion a series of events that led to the present-day
concept of unpublished opinions.  The process was further facilitated in 1971
when the Federal Judicial Center encouraged federal courts to implement a
system limiting publication of opinions.182  Accordingly, all federal circuits
and many state appellate courts developed standards for the publication of
opinions.183
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee of the Judicial Conference
recommended the establishment of an additional committee.184  In light of the
technological advances since the Judicial Conference made its original
recommendation regarding unpublished opinions, this new committee was
charged with studying the continuing need for unpublished opinions.185  Rather
than study problems related to nonpublication and noncitation policies, the
Judicial Conference’s Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure (Advisory Committee) was asked to solicit proposals for
amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.186  Thus, in 1998,
the Advisory Committee conducted a survey of chief circuit judges to
determine the need, if any, for a uniform policy regarding the citation and
publication of judicial opinions.187  The survey revealed the chief judges’ lack
of enthusiasm for a national, uniform policy.188  In 2001, however, the
Department of Justice submitted specific rule language to the Advisory
Committee to establish uniform standards for “the citation of unpublished
opinions,” and the submission prompted the Advisory Committee’s devoted
reexamination of the value of uniform rules regarding unpublished opinions.189
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The discrepancy between the results of the 1998 survey of chief circuit judges
and the proposal by the Department of Justice highlights the varying attitudes
toward the use of unpublished opinions among distinguished members of the
profession.  A study of the two leading cases reveals that the recommendation
by the 1964 Judicial Conference and the ensuing move toward embracing
unpublished opinions continues to serve as a source of intra-judiciary debate.
Two judges, Judge Richard Arnold of the Eighth Circuit and Judge Alex
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, have been the most visible participants in this
debate and have reached differing conclusions about the constitutionality of
rules limiting the publication of opinions and the precedential value of a
citation to an unpublished opinion.
A. The Eighth Circuit’s Rejection of Limited Publication as an
Unconstitutional Expansion of Judicial Power and a Threat to Precedent  
Judge Arnold, in Anastasoff v. United States,190 declared the Eighth
Circuit’s rule on limited publication unconstitutional.  In Anastasoff, the
petitioner sought a tax refund for overpaid federal income taxes,191 but the
argument on which petitioner relied was rejected previously by the Eighth
Circuit in Christie v. United States,192 an unpublished opinion of the court.193
Judge Arnold used his opinion in Anastasoff to declare the Eighth Circuit rule
pertaining to the precedential value of unpublished opinions - a rule similar to
that of the other circuit courts - unconstitutional.194  The rule struck down by
Judge Arnold provided:
Unpublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally
should not cite them.  When relevant to establishing the doctrines
of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case, however,
the parties may cite any unpublished opinion.  Parties may also cite
an unpublished opinion of this court if the opinion has persuasive
value on a material issue and no published opinion of this or
another court would serve as well . . . .195
In striking down the rule as unconstitutional, Judge Arnold held that “the
portion of Rule 28A(i) that declares that unpublished opinions are not
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precedent is unconstitutional under Article III, because it purports to confer on
the federal courts a power that goes beyond the ‘judicial.’”196  Judge Arnold
took a very narrow and strict view of stare decisis and precedent by arguing
that the principles of stare decisis and precedent emanated from the
Constitution and were intended to limit the power of the judiciary.197  Such
limitation, according to Judge Arnold, facilitated the separation of the judicial
and legislative branches.198  Further, “‘depart[ing] from’ established legal
principles” constituted legislating from the bench, which judges lack the power
to do.199
Central to Judge Arnold’s argument was the phrase “judicial power” found
in Article III of the Constitution.200  Article III provides that “[t]he judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”201
Judge Arnold argued that the doctrines of precedent and stare decisis were
inherent in the phrase “judicial power” referenced in Article III and imposed
a limitation on this “judicial power.”202   Judge Arnold surmised that allowing
judges to ignore this mandate through the use of nonprecedential opinions was
an improper expansion of the judicial power.203   Therefore, requiring judges
to adhere to all the past decisions of their respective courts protected the
separation of powers between the three branches of government and facilitated
the proper role of the court — applying established principles in like cases.204
Judge Arnold’s opinion in Anastasoff has drawn criticism from many
sources.205  His view of legal history espoused in the opinion is most
vulnerable to attack.  Judge Arnold claimed “the doctrine of precedent was not
merely well established; it was the historic method of judicial decision-
making, and well regarded as a bulwark of judicial independence in past
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struggles for liberty.”206  This view fails, however, to take into account the
history of the common law in the United States.  As previously mentioned,207
the doctrine of precedent in England — where the doctrine was more strictly
adhered to than in colonial United States — did not develop simultaneously
with the common law.  Instead, the perfection of a reporting system accepted
as accurate was necessary before precedent became a workable doctrine in the
English legal system.  When this system of the common law was imported to
the United States, early Americans changed and adapted it to reflect the
differences between an established, time-honored system in England and a
new, emerging system in the United States.  In order for the common law to
meet the needs of a nascent democracy,
First, judges often did pick and choose which English statutes and
common law precedents were binding within their states.  Second,
judges took it upon themselves to use the customs of the common
citizens of the states as an alternative source of law to the common
law.  Third, even those judges who looked to the common law as
the source of American law felt that the judicial power included the
right to decide whether an American statute complied with the
common law.208
Because judges had wide latitude to decide which statutes and precedents to
import from the English common law, precedent was not as established and
central to the Constitution as Judge Arnold argued.  Additionally, “[t]he state
judiciary in the early Republic did not feel bound to follow the common law
if the common law did not fit the conditions of the Republic.”209  The
discretion granted to early American judges contradicts Judge Arnold’s
contention that precedent was a well-established notion implicit in the
Framers’ drafting of Article III.
Additionally, Judge Arnold’s insistence that the failure to use unpublished
opinions for precedential purposes violates the separation of powers is equally
vulnerable to attack.210  An early nineteenth-century example from
Pennsylvania contradicts Judge Arnold’s belief and questions the soundness
of his conclusion.211  In 1807, the Pennsylvania legislature recognized and
approved the state judiciary’s power to determine which statutes to import
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from England into the law of that state.212  After the state judiciary determined
what laws were in force, a federal judge chose to ignore the established
Pennsylvania precedent and to reconstruct Pennsylvania law, reasoning that
custom and usage had incorporated certain principles into the Pennsylvania
law that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had expressly excluded from that
state’s common law.213  These events in Pennsylvania indicate that the
precedential weight of judicial opinions has not always been considered central
to the separation of powers and is thus not implicit in Article III.   Because a
member of the Pennsylvania judiciary, and not the Pennsylvania legislature,
decided which statutes were in effect in the state, “[i]n Pennsylvania, . . . the
doctrines of precedent and separation of powers did not spring fully formed
into existence after 1789,” thus contradicting the notion that the use of
precedent limits judges’ Article III judicial power.214  Because the notion of
precedent as a tool to facilitate the separation of powers was not realized until
after the drafting of the Constitution, the “judicial power” referenced by the
Framers in Article III cannot be said to apply to that particular notion of
precedent.  Therefore, Judge Arnold’s view that the separation of powers
cannot support a system of nonprecedential, unpublished opinions is not
historically supported.
While Judge Arnold’s Anastasoff opinion declared unconstitutional the
Eighth Circuit’s rule giving unpublished opinions limited precedential weight,
the decision is not likely the last word on the subject.  Four months after
issuing Anastasoff, Judge Arnold issued another opinion in Anastasoff v.
United States215 (Anastasoff II), in which he vacated his earlier decision.216 
After the issuance of the original decision, Anastasoff filed a petition for
rehearing en banc and urged the Eighth Circuit to abandon the unpublished
Christie opinion on which the United States relied.217  Nevertheless, the Eighth
Circuit, in Judge Arnold’s Anastasoff II opinion, granted the petition for
rehearing en banc, declared the case moot, and vacated its previous judgment
and opinion based on action taken by the Internal Revenue Service in the
months between the issuance of the original opinion and the rehearing.218  The
appellant argued that the importance of resolving the issues surrounding
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
430 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:403
219. Id. at 1056.
220. Id.  Ironically, it appears that Judge Arnold was forced to abandon his prior ruling that
stressed the importance of prior rulings (i.e., precedent).
221. By disposing of Anastasoff II on the technical issue of standing, Judge Arnold remained
consistent with the principles upon which he decided the original case.  The judicial power
delegated by Article III — so central to Judge Arnold’s argument — mandates that federal
judges decide only actual cases and controversies before them.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see
also Buchanan v. Evans, 423 U.S. 963, 968 (1976) (“The grant of judicial power in Art. III of
the United States Constitution limits federal courts to cases and controversies, and a dispute
about the constitutionality of a statute which is no longer in effect is moot in the classical
sense.”).  Where the case or controversy has become moot, proper protocol requires that the
judgment and opinion be vacated.  Anastasoff II, 235 F.3d at 1056.
222. Id.
223. 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
224. Id. at 1158-59.
225. Id. at 1159.
unpublished opinions should save the case from being declared moot.219  Even
though Judge Arnold rejected this argument, he made clear that:
The controversy over the status of unpublished opinions is, to be
sure, of great interest and importance, but this sort of factor will not
save a case from becoming moot.  We sit to decide cases, not
issues, and whether unpublished opinions have precedential effect
no longer has any relevance for the decision of this tax-refund
case.220
Although Judge Arnold vacated his earlier decision on technical grounds,221
Judge Arnold reiterated that “[t]he constitutionality of that portion of Rule
28A(i) which says that unpublished opinions have no precedential effect
remains an open question in this Circuit.”222
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Acceptance of Unpublished Opinions as an Inherent
Judicial Tool for Managing Precedent in Light of Increasing Caseloads
In contrast to the rules of the Eighth Circuit, the constitutionality of the
Ninth Circuit’s rule concerning the precedential value of unpublished opinions
is not an open question.  In Hart v. Massanari,223 the Ninth Circuit was also
confronted with a case in which unpublished opinions assumed a central role.
In Hart, the appellant cited an unpublished opinion in his opening brief to the
court in violation of a Ninth Circuit rule prohibiting the general citation of
unpublished opinions.224  The Ninth Circuit ordered the appellant to show
cause as to why he should not be disciplined for violating the rule.225  In
response, the appellant relied on Anastasoff to question the constitutionality
of the Ninth Circuit’s rule, which was similar to the rule stricken by Judge
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Arnold.226  In writing the opinion resolving the show-cause order, Judge
Kozinski took a more expansive view of precedent and attempted to place the
principles of precedent and the use of unpublished opinions in the modern
legal context when he said:
We believe that Anastasoff overstates the case.  Rules that empower
courts of appeals to issue nonprecedential decision do not cut those
courts free from all legal rules and precedents; if they did, we might
find cause for alarm.  But such rules have a much more limited
effect: They allow panels of the courts of appeals to determine
whether future panels, as well as judges of the inferior courts of the
circuit, will be bound by particular rulings.  This is hardly the same
as turning our back on all precedents, or on the concept of
precedent altogether.  Rather, it is an effort to deal with precedent
in the context of a modern legal system, which has evolved
considerably since the early days of common law, and even since
the time the Constitution was adopted.227
In Hart, Judge Kozinski challenged the assertions of Judge Arnold and
defended the use of limited precedential status and publication standards as a
necessary part of a growing and overburdened judiciary.228
First, Judge Kozinski critiqued Judge Arnold’s view of Article III.229  With
the phrase “judicial power” being “more likely descriptive than prescriptive,”
Judge Kozinski questioned its limiting effect.230  Judge Kozinski interpreted
the phrase “judicial power” referenced in Article III as describing what judges
must do to comply with their constitutional mandates.231  According to Judge
Kozinski, judges must decide only cases and controversies and must comply
with the requirements of due process, jury trials, and other specific
constitutional provisions, and by doing so, judges successfully exercise their
judicial powers.232  Unlike Judge Arnold, Judge Kozinski took an expansive
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view of the phrase “judicial power” and saw it as empowering the judiciary to
react to changes over time instead of restricting the judiciary to an inaccurate
history.233
One such reaction is the unpublished opinion.  Unpublished opinions fall
within a larger category of judicial practices used by federal and state courts
across the nation without any constitutional basis.234  Courts across the country
employ practices promoting the efficiency of the court such as policies
pertaining to the issuance of written opinions, the availability of equitable
relief, and the hearing of appeals by a panel of judges, to name a few, and
these practices are not founded upon constitutional prescriptions.235  Judge
Kozinski’s hesitation to recognize a limiting effect of “judicial power”
stemmed from the danger he perceived in giving constitutional status to a
custom of the courts.236  Bestowing constitutional status on such customs
would not allow aspects of the law to change when change is needed or
desired.
Second, Judge Kozinski challenged Judge Arnold’s view of judicial history
and its role in the development of a strict doctrine of precedent.  Judge
Kozinski asserted:
[I]n order to follow the path forged by Anastasoff, we would have
to be convinced that the practice in question was one the Framers
considered so integral and well-understood that they did not have
to bother stating it, even though they spelled out many other
limitations in considerable detail.
. . . .
The Constitution does not contain an express prohibition against
issuing nonprecedential opinions because the Framers would have
seen nothing wrong with the practice.237
With external sources, such as treatises and reports compiled by lawyers and
students, being the primary sources of law during the early history of English
law, it is difficult to state that strict adherence to the decisions in prior cases
has been in the forefront of English and American legal history.  Further,
Judge Kozinski directly contradicted Judge Arnold’s view of the nature of
precedent in American legal history by stating that “[c]ontrary to Anastasoff’s
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view, it [is] emphatically not the case that all decisions of common law courts
were treated as precedent binding on future courts unless distinguished or
rejected.”238  Rather, custom formed the basis of the common law and was
sensitive to the needs of changing circumstances.239  The modern concept of
binding precedent did not arise until the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries; therefore, Judge Arnold’s view that binding precedent emanates
from the Constitution does not comport with historical record.240  Nevertheless,
Judge Kozinski agreed with Judge Arnold to a limited extent by stating that
“[w]hile we agree with Anastasoff that the principle of precedent was well
established in the common law courts by the time Article III of the
Constitution was written, we do not agree that it was known and applied in the
strict sense in which we apply binding authority today.”241
Third, Judge Kozinski placed the unpublished opinion and binding authority
in the context of the modern judicial system to show that the concepts are
important to judicial efficiency.  The number of cases brought before appellate
courts has increased rapidly and exponentially.242  Judge Kozinski explained
that because appellate courts generally lack discretionary review, unpublished
and nonprecedential opinions allow appellate judges to select a manageable
number of cases in which to make a meaningful contribution to the established
law.243  This quasi-discretionary review provides a resolution to all disputes
heard by the court but does so in a way that promotes efficiency.244  Because
an unpublished opinion is essentially a letter from a court to parties familiar
with the facts of their case, the language of an unpublished opinion is often
inadequate to be applied to future cases arising from different facts.245  Further
expounding his position regarding judicial efficiency, Judge Kozinski also
argued that a proliferation of binding precedential opinions causes massive
problems in the modern legal system.246  Attaching binding precedential status
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to all opinions leads to confusion and conflict,247 while also increasing the
burden on the court and on lawyers trying to compile and interpret multiple
opinions.248  According to Judge Kozinski, requiring all opinions, published
and unpublished, to carry precedential weight not only increases the burden on
the court system, it is also unnecessary:
Cases decided by nonprecedential disposition generally involve
facts that are materially indistinguishable from those of prior
published opinions.  Writing a second, third or tenth opinion in the
same area of the law, based on materially indistinguishable facts
will, at best, clutter up the law books and databases with redundant
and thus unhelpful authority.249
Therefore, the imposition of a publication requirement would undermine the
federal judiciary’s efficiency goal by requiring judges to spend more time
writing what has already been adequately written.
In summary, Judge Kozinski argued that judges who issue unpublished and
nonprecedential opinions are not exceeding their constitutional duty to
exercise judicial power.250  Judge Kozinski argued that history did not support
the Anastasoff position asserting that the Framers intended for the doctrine of
binding precedent to be implicitly included in Article III.251  Rather, history
suggests that, at the framing of the Constitution, common law and precedent
were viewed as flexible doctrines, and the modern concept of binding
precedent did not emerge until well after ratification of the Constitution.252
Finally, Judge Kozinski illustrated the need for unpublished and
nonprecedential opinions in an ever-growing legal system.253  While the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits have battled with the constitutionality and prudence of
unpublished opinions and their effect on the doctrine of precedent, the biggest
challenge to the Tenth Circuit’s rules regarding unpublished opinion may
come not from litigation, but from an act of Congress.
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258. The Tenth Circuit Rules pertaining to the issuance of published opinions and their
precedential value and to the citation of unpublished opinions provide that:
36.1 Orders and judgments. The court does not write opinions in every case.
The court may dispose of an appeal or petition without written opinion.
Disposition without opinion does not mean that the case is unimportant.  It
means that the case does not require application of new points of law that
would make the decision a valuable precedent.  
36.2 Publication. When the opinion of the district court, an administrative
agency, or the Tax Court has been published, this court ordinarily designates
its disposition for publication.  If the disposition is by order and judgment,
the court will publish only the result of the appeal.
10TH CIR. R. 36.1-.2.  Furthermore, the rule pertaining to the citation of unpublished opinions
provides: 
36.3 Citation of unpublished opinions/orders and judgments.
(A) Not precedent. Unpublished orders and judgments of this court are not
binding precedents, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res
IV. Rules Governing the Use of Unpublished Opinions in Oklahoma
Federal and State Courts
As a part of the Tenth Circuit, Oklahoma federal courts adhere to Tenth
Circuit rules regarding publication and citation of opinions,254 but state courts
in Oklahoma have their own rules regarding publication and citation.255
Furthermore, Oklahoma’s bifurcated appellate system assigns jurisdiction over
civil appeals to the Oklahoma Supreme Court and jurisdiction over criminal
appeals to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.256  One of the
consequences of this bifurcated system is a discrepancy between citation and
publication rules before Oklahoma’s highest courts.257  Even though
discrepancies exist, the rules of each court strive to balance the interests of the
litigants with the interests of the administration of justice as applied in the
respective courts.
A. The Tenth Circuit Rules and the Proposed Changes
Unpublished opinions carry limited weight in the Tenth Circuit.258  The
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judicata, and collateral estoppel.  
(B) Reference. Citation of an unpublished decision is disfavored.  But an
unpublished decision may be cited if: 
X(1)it has persuasive value with respect to a material issue that has not been
addressed in a published opinion; and 
X(2)it would assist the court in its disposition.  
(C) Attach copy. A Copy of an unpublished decision must be attached to any
document that cites it.  If an unpublished decision is cited at oral argument,








circuit rules state that written opinions will not be issued in every case, but the
absence of a written opinion is not a statement about the case’s importance.259
Disposition of a case without written opinion simply “means that the case does
not require application of new points of law that would make the decision a
valuable precedent.”260 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit assigns limited
precedential value to these opinions by adopting a rule stating “[u]npublished
orders and judgments of [the Tenth Circuit] are not binding precedents, except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.”261
Combining the language of these two rules, it becomes clear that the Tenth
Circuit publishes only those cases which significantly add to the body of
caselaw in the circuit.
Further, the citation of unpublished opinions is generally disfavored.262  If
two conditions are met, however, the circuit permits citation of unpublished
opinions.  First, the unpublished opinion must have “persuasive value with
respect to a material issue that has not been addressed in a published
opinion.”263  Second, the citation of the unpublished opinion must “assist the
court in its disposition.”264  By imposing these two conditions on citation, the
Tenth Circuit attempts to curtail the unnecessary citation of unpublished
opinions by lawyers while providing a check on the circuit’s adherence to its
own standards.  Because the circuit publishes opinions that it considers to be
valuable precedent, the condition permitting citation of an unpublished opinion
to support an issue not addressed in a published opinion aids the circuit in
internally monitoring its publication standards and ensuring that all opinions
of valuable precedent are indeed published.
While the Tenth Circuit currently enforces its own rules regarding
unpublished opinions, the Tenth Circuit may soon be forced to adhere to a
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proposed change in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure establishing a
national policy concerning the use of unpublished opinions in all federal
courts.  In response to the debate concerning the citation of unpublished
opinions and the differences among circuit rules, the Judicial Conference
proposed a change to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.265  Proposed
Rule 32.1 forbids a federal court from prohibiting “the citation of federal
judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have
been: (i) designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not for publication,’ ‘non-precedential,’
‘not precedent,’ or the like; and (ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.”266  The
text of the rule implicates only the citation of unpublished opinions but not the
weight of precedential value to assign when such opinions are cited.  The
committee notes accompanying the proposed rule — prepared by the Judicial
Conference’s Advisory Committee — shed light on the precedential value of
the citation.  According to the notes, the Advisory Committee understands the
proposed rule to mean that “a court of appeals may not prohibit a party from
citing an unpublished opinion of a federal court for its persuasive value or for
any other reason.”267  This committee note indicates that unpublished opinions
will become persuasive precedent upon adoption of the rule.  Thus, a party
may cite an unpublished opinion to bolster its argument, but a court is not
bound to follow the decision or reasoning in the unpublished opinion.
The Judicial Conference met and approved the proposed Rule 32.1 and
transmitted the rule, with recommendation for approval, to the United States
Supreme Court on November 29, 2005.268  Then, on April 12, 2006, the
Supreme Court approved the rule submitted by the Judicial Conference and
transmitted the rule to Congress.269  Before December 1, 2006, Congress has
the ability to enact legislation modifying or abolishing the proposed Rule
32.1.270  Absent such legislation, the Tenth Circuit’s Rule 36 will become
obsolete, as it creates a direct conflict with the proposed rule by generally
disfavoring and prohibiting the citation of unpublished opinions.  Even though
proposed Rule 32.1 has been recommended for adoption by the Judicial
Conference and the Supreme Court, practitioners still debate the usefulness
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and value of the rule.271  Nevertheless, if adopted by Congress, proposed Rule
32.1 will impose on the Tenth Circuit, as well as other federal circuit courts,
a uniform approach regarding the citation of unpublished opinions for all
opinions issued after January 1, 2007.
B. Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has adopted publication and citation rules
similar to the Tenth Circuit rules.272  The Oklahoma Constitution directs the
Oklahoma Supreme Court to establish rules for the form of its opinions and the
opinions of the intermediate Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals.273  Consistent
with this obligation, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has adopted rules
governing the publication and citation of its opinions.274  All Oklahoma
Supreme Court opinions are to be prepared and issued in memorandum form,
without a formal published opinion, unless the opinion:
(1) Establishes a new rule of law or alters or modifies an existing
rule;
(2) Involves a legal issue of continuing public interest;
(3) Criticizes or explains existing law;
(4) Applies an established rule of law to a factual situation
significantly different from that in published opinions of the courts
of this state;
(5) Resolves an apparent conflict of authority; or
(6) Constitutes a significant and non-duplicative contribution to
legal literature:
(a) by an historical review of the law; or
(b) by describing legislative history.275
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Further, the Oklahoma Supreme Court gives no precedential authority to its
unpublished opinions and generally forbids citation to them in any materials
submitted to that court or any other court.277  Under a very narrow set of
circumstances, however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court permits citation to an
unpublished opinion.  Citations to unpublished opinions are permitted only to
establish claims of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.278
The implication of such a strict rule against the citation of unpublished
opinions has ramifications beyond the Oklahoma Supreme Court itself.  As
indicated in the title of Rule 1.200, “Opinions of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Civil Appeals,”  and in the stated scope of the rules, these citation and
publication rules apply to the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals as well.279
According to its rules, the Oklahoma Supreme Court forbids citation of its
unpublished opinions not only by and to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, but
also by and to any other state or federal court.280  Because of the stricter
citation rules of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, unpublished opinions of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court are not as readily available as unpublished opinions
from the Tenth Circuit.281  Access to these unpublished opinions is limited by
a rule requiring that “[o]pinions marked Not For Official Publication shall not
be published in the unofficial reporter, nor on the Supreme Court World Wide
Web site, nor in the official reporter.”282  Because of the limited availability of
unpublished opinions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Oklahoma
Court of Civil Appeals, permissive citation would unjustly favor those who
possess the time, energy, and resources to scour the records of the Oklahoma
Supreme Court to find an unpublished opinion believed to be on point.
C. Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Rules
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has the same power to establish
the form and precedential value of its decisions as the Oklahoma Supreme
Court.283  The Oklahoma legislature, however, mandates that all opinions of
the Court of Criminal Appeals be in writing and recorded in the journal of the
court.284  Like the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
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Appeals does not assign binding authority to its unpublished opinions.285  In
contrast to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, parties may cite
unpublished opinions to the Court of Criminal Appeals “provided counsel
states that no published case would serve as well the purpose for which
counsel cites it, and provided further that counsel shall provide opposing
counsel and the Court with a copy of the unpublished opinion.”286
In Johnson v. State,287 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals considered
a challenge to the court’s practice of issuing unpublished summary opinions.288
The petitioner argued that such a practice in his case deprived him of his due
process rights and indicated that the court failed to properly review his case.289
In response, the court noted that all opinions issued by the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals were required to be in writing, and such a requirement
ensured that his case was thoroughly examined and reviewed, thereby
providing petitioner adequate protection.290  The court did not dismiss
petitioner’s claim without consideration, nor did the court believe that the
petitioner’s claim lacked importance.291  The court merely acted in accordance
with its rules by issuing an unpublished summary opinion containing the
court’s rationale, rather than issuing a fully reasoned and citable published
opinion of precedential value.  The court also noted that “[t]here is no state or
federal constitutional right to an opinion which contains a full compendium of
legal citations to each issue raised.”292  The lack of such a right permits courts
to establish systems of publication and citation that strive to balance the needs
of the litigants in resolving disputes and the needs of the judicial system in
promoting efficiency.  Finally, the court addressed the policy reasons for
issuing unpublished summary opinions when it stated:
There is currently a major concern that the quality of justice is
being diminished by backlog at all levels of appellate criminal
work, and that this backlog in turn contributes to a lack of finality
of judgment in our law.  It therefore is incumbent upon this Court
to dispose of cases as expeditiously as possible, while remaining
cognizant that no case is as important to an individual as the one
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which concerns him or her.  To that end, we have determined that
unnecessary verbiage and redundant literary exercises are counter-
productive.  As a result, this Court has officially adopted the
summary opinion format, for use when appropriate, to ensure a
prompt and just disposition of the matters filed before it.  In each
case that comes before this Court, we thoroughly consider the
entire record before us on appeal, including the original record,
transcripts and all the authority and arguments contained in the
briefs of the parties.  This thorough consideration is reflected in
language set forth in each summary opinion.293
Johnson illuminates the reasoning behind the limited publication rules and
reassures litigants appearing before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
that their appeals will be fairly adjudicated regardless of whether the court
issues a full, published opinion in the case.  Moreover, the subject matter over
which the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction highlights the
importance of the court’s thorough and careful consideration of cases before
it, as the court’s decisions greatly affect a person’s liberty.  As such,
petitioners to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals should be confident
that their cases will be given due attention and thoughtful consideration.
Allowing petitioners to cite unpublished opinions in some circumstances gives
petitioners the opportunity to bring all supporting authority to the court’s
attention, even if the authority is unpublished.  Doing so reassures the
petitioner that the court has availed itself of all of the relevant and applicable
caselaw regarding the appeal while the court maintains a system of general
limited publication.  
Along with the Tenth Circuit and Oklahoma Supreme Court, the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals has instituted rules governing publication and
citation of its opinions.  These rules, at both the federal and state level,
facilitate the balancing of the goals of the litigants, the judges, and the judicial
system and allow judges of those courts to craft a coherent body of caselaw for
their respective jurisdictions.  Through their rules regarding the publication
and citation of opinions, the Tenth Circuit, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, and
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals demonstrate the commitment of
courts to judicial efficiency and a principled resolution of disputes.
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V. Oklahoma’s Use of Unpublished Opinions to Achieve Judicial Harmony
Judicial decisions serve two main purposes.  First, they resolve disputes
between parties in a present case before a court.294  Second, they establish rules
of law to be applied by judges in successive cases.295  Unpublished opinions
play a critical role in achieving the delicate balance between these two
purposes for which the judiciary constantly strives, and limiting the
precedential status of these unpublished opinions actually contributes to their
usefulness.  Resolving disputes at the appellate level is a laborious process.
Judges scour briefs submitted by the parties, review the record of the lower
court, read relevant authorities, and often hear oral arguments before crafting
an opinion in a particular case.296  Issuing well-written, published precedential
opinions is vital to apprise legal professionals and the public of the state of the
law, but writing such opinions takes an enormous amount of time.297
Nevertheless, published opinions are essential to this country’s common law
system of precedent.  In crafting a published opinion, judges must:
[S]et forth the facts in sufficient detail so lawyers and judges
unfamiliar with the case can understand the question presented.  At
the same time, [the opinion] must omit irrelevant facts that could
form a spurious ground for distinguishing the opinion.  The legal
discussion must be focused enough to dispose of the case at hand,
yet broad enough to provide useful guidance in future cases.
Because [judges] normally write opinions where the law is unclear,
[they] must explain why [they] are adopting one rule while
rejecting others.  [They] must also make sure that the new rule does
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With the caseloads of courts continually increasing,299 spending the time it
takes to write such an opinion on all of the cases that appear before the court
would only exacerbate the backlog that exists at all levels of the judiciary.300
Further, requiring that all opinions be published, and thus requiring this
fastidious wording, would also likely bring “an across-the-board lessening of
quality, because judicial resources would be stretched even further, and we
would see scores of remarkably brief and uninformative, but nonetheless
‘published,’ opinions.”301  A body of caselaw built on such a shaky foundation
clutters and distorts the source from which precedents must be gleaned.
Avoiding an unstable foundation of the law, and instead crafting a cohesive,
manageable foundation in which unpublished opinions have a proper role, has
both practical and policy-driven incentives.  These incentives serve to promote
the two purposes of judicial opinions — settling disputes between parties and
establishing precedent to guide subsequent cases.  Adopting a system of
unpublished opinions does not frustrate these two purposes when publication
standards are promulgated with these purposes in mind.
A. Practical Values of Unpublished Opinions
Practically, the use of unpublished opinions allows judges to dispose of
routine cases in an expeditious manner, because “[u]npublished decisions tend
to involve straightforward points of law — if they did not, they would be
published.”302  As several appellate judges have noted, some cases involve the
application of well-established law and their resolutions do not meaningfully
affect the state of the law.303  By allowing judges to issue unpublished opinions
in such cases, judges are able to focus more of their attention and resources on
opinions that establish new precedent or alter settled precedent.304
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310. 10TH CIR. R. 36.3(A); OKLA SUP. CT. R. 1.200(b)(5).
311. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1336-37 (defining “res judicata” as “[a]n
issue that has been definitively settled by judicial decision”).
312. Id. at 279 (defining “collateral estoppel” as “[a] doctrine barring a party from
relitigating an issue determined against that party in an earlier action, even if the second action
differs significantly from the first one”). 
313. Id. at 903 (defining “law of the case” as “[t]he doctrine holding that a decision rendered
in a former appeal of a case is binding in a later appeal”).
Oklahoma federal and state courts recognize the practicality of issuing
unpublished opinions and orders.  The Tenth Circuit’s rule regarding such
opinions expressly states that some cases before the court do not contribute
anything additional to the state of the law.305  The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s
rules recognize this fact as well.306  The rules establish six criteria, one of
which must be satisfied before the court will publish an opinion in a case.307
Each of the six criteria articulates a condition that would substantially affect
the existing body of law.308  Because all of the court’s opinions are
unpublished unless one of the six conditions is established,309 the court
implicitly acknowledges that some cases will not significantly alter the law and
need not be published.  Without spending the time necessary to produce high-
quality published opinions on cases that do not add significantly to circuit or
state law, Oklahoma courts can redirect their resources to the cases that do
have an effect on the state of the law.
Also, both federal and state courts in Oklahoma treat unpublished decisions
and opinions as decisions on the merits, thus meeting the requirement that
judicial decisions resolve disputes between parties.  The Tenth Circuit rules
and the Oklahoma Supreme Court rules have provisions for the citation and
authority of unpublished opinions when establishing claims of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or law of the case.310  Because the doctrines of res
judicata,311 collateral estoppel,312 and law of the case313 rest on the proposition
that an issue or case has already been settled by a court of proper jurisdiction,
a provision allowing the citation of unpublished opinions for the purposes of
establishing these doctrines accepts the unpublished opinion as a settlement of
the dispute between the litigants.  The rules of the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals lack a specific reference to these legal doctrines, but the
more general nature of its citation rule permits the citation of unpublished
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opinions for these purposes anyway.314  Rules regarding unpublished opinions
like those found in Oklahoma federal and state courts promote a practical
approach to judicial decision making and do not deny litigants a resolution of
their disputes.
The proposed change in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure could
hinder the practicality of unpublished opinions and, in turn, create an
unworkable mess at the federal level.  The co-chair of the ABA Section of
Litigation’s Appellate Practice Committee, Paul J. Watford, thinks that the
proposed Rule 32.1 “could create a nightmare for practitioners and trial court
judges in the future, as many lawyers may seek to quote holdings from
unpublished decisions ‘and there is no real way for judges or attorneys to
know if the underlying facts of that case make it an appropriate precedent.’”315
Thus, permitting the citation of unpublished opinions will erode judicial
efficiency by dramatically increasing the pool of cases in which lawyers and
judges must research in order to formulate legal arguments and perhaps lead
to erroneous applications of the law as many opinions in the expanded pool
might not necessarily contain language intended to be broadly applicable.  In
relation to the current system in which each circuit promulgates its own rules,
Watford also notes that “[i]t’s not that hard to figure out which citation rule to
follow, depending upon which circuit you are in.”316  By steering clear of a
national policy with respect to the citation of unpublished opinions, each
circuit is able to adapt to its own needs with regard to publication and citation
rules.  The retention of local control promotes a practical and judicially
efficient approach to the work of an overburdened judiciary while also
allowing judges to closely monitor the cohesiveness of the law of the circuit.
Currently, the Oklahoma state courts are sensitive to the needs of all of those
involved in the legal system, but the proposed change to the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure threatens the delicate balance between efficiency and
dispute resolution achieved by the Tenth Circuit.  
B. Policy Values of Unpublished Opinions
Policy concerns of maintaining a coherent body of law, from which to
determine the state of the law, also favor the use of unpublished opinions even
though the unpublished opinions are not precedential themselves.  With the
number of case filings and the workload of courts constantly increasing, courts
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are forced to decide more cases, and “the vast number of decisions rendered
threatens coherence by creating innumerable rulings which are impossible to
assimilate.”317  Furthermore, not all cases filed before a court have equal
merit.318  By allowing judges to choose which of these cases are most helpful
in clarifying the law or in departing from established precedent, judges are
essentially able to “separate[] the diamonds from the dross.”319  This practice
of evaluating the publication of a case opinion on the basis of the opinion’s
ability to add to precedent does not threaten the doctrine of precedent and has
been undertaken in the past without substantial criticism.
From the inception of books reporting the proceedings of courts in England,
authors of those books have omitted cases for one reason or another.320  When
the reporting system developed in the United States, its incompleteness was a
major hurdle to its usefulness.321  Although, when Wheaton omitted cases that
he felt had no precedential value from the Reports, his use of discretion in
establishing a record of the law went virtually unquestioned.322  
Today, it is the judges writing the opinions themselves who decide whether
a case merits publication, and provisions in the Oklahoma rules at the federal
and state level serve as a check on the judiciary in exercising its power to
determine which cases become precedential and which do not.  For example,
the Tenth Circuit disfavors the citation of unpublished opinions.323  The circuit,
however, permits citation to an unpublished opinion if the citation has
persuasive value as to a point of law not addressed in a published opinion and
the citation will aid the court in rendering its decision on the matter.324
Permitting citations in this instance allows the court to internally review its
own publication decisions.  Theoretically, since unpublished opinions do not
substantially add to precedent,325 they should contain no novel applications of
law.  If the court is confronted with a citation to an unpublished opinion, then
the court is forced to examine its adherence to its own rules.  By including
such a provision, the Tenth Circuit has developed a useful mechanism for the
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court to internally monitor its own judges’ adherence to the rules of the circuit
with respect to the publication of opinions. 
Similarly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court crafted its rules to ensure that
opinions establishing or modifying precedent are published.  Of the three
courts addressed in this comment, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has the
clearest publication guidelines.  One of six criteria must be met before the
opinion is published, and when the opinion meets one of those criteria, it is
published and becomes binding precedent in Oklahoma.326  These guidelines
assist members of the court in making a publication decision.  Another
provision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court rules also ensures judicial
compliance with the rules.  The rules allow “[a] party or other interested
person” to make a motion requesting the court to publish an unpublished
opinion that the party believes has precedential value.327  This procedure
creates an external check on the judiciary by inviting legal professionals to
examine the court’s use of its unpublished opinions and bring to light any
alleged inconsistencies between the court’s rules and the court’s practice.
Finally, the broader rule promulgated by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals reflects the differing nature of that court’s jurisdiction.  The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals permits citation of unpublished opinions
as persuasive authority whenever a party believes that no published opinion
suffices to support a particular point.328  Precedent in the criminal law,
however, does not occupy the same revered position that it occupies in the
civil law.329  With a person’s liberty, and sometimes even life, at stake in
criminal matters, permitting parties to cite the most similar and most relevant
authority available ensures that the court is fully apprised of all relevant
information before deciding whether to deprive one of liberty or life.  Also,
because unpublished opinions may only be cited as persuasive authority,330 the
court still maintains control in the creation of a coherent body of law.  Even
if the court is confronted with a citation to an unpublished opinion adverse to
its binding precedent, it is not required to follow the adverse unpublished
opinion. 
Throughout its history, the doctrine of precedent has been flexible and
adaptive to the needs of the particular era.  Because precedent originated with
those characteristics, the doctrine survives even when obstacles arise in its
developmental path.  In Oklahoma, precedent has been critically important and
the rules promulgated by courts in Oklahoma strive to protect that revered
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doctrine.  The provisions of the rules in Oklahoma federal and state courts
appear to have been crafted in an effort to balance the protection of precedent
with an efficient resolution of disputes.  The rules in Oklahoma take into
account the differing nature and needs of Oklahoma’s courts and ultimately
facilitate the achievement of a balance between the litigants, the courts, and the
judicial system.
VI. Conclusion
As the number of cases in the United States continues to rise, federal and
state judiciaries face increasing challenges in discharging their judicial duties
in an efficient and expeditious manner.  With the increasing caseload comes
a growing possibility for conflict within the law and a swelling base from
which judges and attorneys must decipher the law.  Because of this changing
characteristic of the judiciary, unpublished opinions have great value.  The use
of unpublished opinions curbs the strain on court resources while promoting
the facilitation of a manageable body of caselaw.  Without unpublished
opinions, courts would be even more overwhelmed and the legal profession
would have many more opinions to evaluate in order to determine the state of
the law.  By establishing precedent through carefully selected published
opinions that make meaningful contributions to the state of the law and by
using the unpublished form to apply that existing precedent to subsequent
cases, the judicial system achieves a healthy balance between the interests of
the litigants in settling disputes and the interests of the judicial system itself in
promoting a logical and consistent body of caselaw.  Publication and citation
rules promulgated with these purposes in mind free judges to focus on building
a stable body of caselaw from which to draw precedent instead of forcing
judges to fill their libraries with reporter volumes.  Because of the internal and
external monitoring mechanisms inherent in their rules ensuring publication
of cases that do establish new law, the state and federal courts in Oklahoma
have succeeded in achieving this delicate balance.
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